We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that re- ‡ect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents'preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status de…ne the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.
Introduction
When following fashion or joining a political party, choosing a home or …nding a job, individuals'choices de…ne group membership. In such situations, individuals are often motivated by status seeking. On the one hand, all members of a given group enjoy the same social status relative to other groups. On the other hand, the status of members of the same group may di¤er in social status relative to each other when individual heterogeneity is taken into account. Thus, social status has a 'global'(inter-group) and a 'local'(intra-group) dimension.
In this work we study the interplay between global and local status in group formation by quality-indexed players of two distinct types. We take a player's type to capture innate characteristics such as nationality, ethnic background, or skill-type. Thus groups may be homogeneous (i.e., contain one type of players) or heterogeneous (i.e., contain both types of players) in nature. Depending on players' preferences for global and local status as represented by a constant elasticity of substitution utility function, we obtain di¤erent sets of core-stable outcomes. We further discuss these outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. Segregated outcomes refer to partitions of the player set in which high-quality and low-quality players of each type are members of di¤erent groups. Instead, integrated outcomes refer to partitions in which the type-speci…c average quality of players in each group is the same.
Our work contributes to the theoretical literature in economics on socially referenced preferences inspired by Schelling (1978) , on social status started by Frank (1985) , and in particular is akin to models founded on constrained interdependence (cf. Cole et al. 1992 ). 1 The novelty of this work is in its focus on the way global and local status jointly shape group formation, and in its methodology rooted in the hedonic games tradition which allows for an arbitrary number of groups to be formed, and for groups of arbitrary size.
More closely, our study is related to Milchtiach and Winter (2002) and Watts (2007) who also discuss segregation within a status-based preferences setting. We build upon the work of Watts (2007) in de…ning our notions of local and global status and the properties of segregation and integration.
As in Watts (2007) , our agents prefer to have a higher local status measured by their relative position in the group. While we measure the relative position as the distance from the average, she captures it by the rank of the individual in the group. 2 Moreover, while global status in her work is measured by the average quality of agents in the group, here, global status is given by the average quality of group members of the other type. Therefore, an agent's quality a¤ects the group global status directly in Watts's sense, but it a¤ects it only in strategic terms here. Milchtiach and Winter (2002) , on the other hand, de…ne agents' preferences to be decreasing in the distance from the average quality. While there are many situations where such preferences are a good proxy for reality-e.g., voting on the level of public 1 For a very recent extensive survey of theoretical works on social status as well as studies that provide empirical evidence for the signi…cance of status seeking in economics, see Truyts (2010) . 2 Notice that 'relative position'is a more general notion than 'rank'as the di¤erence in ranks of two consecutively ordered agents is the same for all distinct pairs of consecutively ordered agents, while the di¤erence in relative positions may di¤er.
good-there are other situations in which having a higher than the average index is desirable, e.g., when reward is based on relative performance. A more important distinction between our work and the works of the authors mentioned above is that they study group formation with a restriction on the number of groups that may be formed when players are of a homogeneous type. As a consequence, the notion of stability used here, the core, is not applicable in their works. Finally, as we investigate various types of preference pro…les in which local and global status jointly determine agents' choices, we …nd conditions for which integrated outcomes may be stable.
In contrast, segregated outcomes are the unique type of stable outcomes in these authors'works.
This paper also has a place within the vast literature on group formation when agents'preferences over group membership depend on the identity of the other members of the group. Group formation by heterogeneous types of agents has been analyzed in a large literature on two-sided matching problems originated by Shapley and Shubik (1972) . The hedonic coalition formation literature (cf. Drèze and Greenberg, 1980 ) studies group formation when agents are homogeneous and their preferences depend on group membership only. Our work may be viewed as marrying these two strands of the literature. 3 Another strand of the literature that combines matching and coalition formation is that on e¤ective coalitions (cf. Kaneko and Wooders, 1982) . Like that literature, we use the notion of core to study stability, however, we do not impose any restrictions on the type of coalitions that may form.
Within the matching literature, our work is closely related to the class of papers on many-to-one matchings with peer e¤ects (see Dutta, and Massó, 1997 ; and more recently Echenique and Yenmez, 2007; Pycia, 2007; and Revilla, 2007) . The di¤erence between our work and theirs is that in our framework group formation occurs on both sides of the market while in theirs it happens on one side of the market only. Our paper is also related to the work of Kaneko and Kimura (1992) who study group formation by heterogeneous types agents, black and white, whose preferences over groups depend on the size of the group. Similarly, Karni and Schmeidler (1990) study the splitting of the population which contains two types of agents into three groups when preferences depend on the relative size of each group. In contrast, in our work peer e¤ects are not size-based.
In this paper, we use the notion of the core to study stability where identity is conceptualized as a hedonic trait, thus our work is also related to the literature on hedonic coalition formation. Banerjee et al. (2001) , Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) , and Ihlé (2007) , among others, introduce various notions of stability and provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of stable partitions in hedonic games. In this literature, however, identity is summarized in the index of each agent and authors do not discuss heterogeneous types of agents. Moreover, the preference pro…les studied here di¤er from those usually analyzed in the literature such as separable, size-based, and symmetric preferences.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on local public goods (cf. Tiebout, 1956 ; and, more recently, Conley and Wooders, 2001) as we, too, study group membership by heterogeneous types of agents. We, however, do not discuss public group production and the size of the partition in our model is not restricted as in the case of jurisdictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic concepts used in our analysis. In Section 3 we characterize the set of core stable outcomes for di¤erent parameter values of the constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In particular, when individuals seek only local status or when local and global status are considered to be (imperfect) substitutes, we show the generic uniqueness of the core: in all core-stable outcomes agents have zero utility. When individuals seek only global status, instead, the core stable outcomes vary in terms of players' utility levels. In this case, we provide an algorithm that characterizes the core-stable outcomes. We further provide a characterization of the core when global and local status are treated as substitutes and show the nonemptiness of the core by means of another algorithm. Finally, we conclude in Section 4 with some insights that our analysis contributes to the existing literature.
Notation and De…nitions
Let N a = f1 a ; 2 a ; : : : ; m a g and N b = 1 b ; 2 b ; : : : ; n b with m n be two disjoint and …nite sets of agents of type a and type b, respectively. For each player i 2 N := N a [ N b we denote by N i = fX N j i 2 Xg the collection of all coalitions containing i. A partition of N is called a coalition structure. For each coalition structure and each player i 2 N , we denote by (i) the coalition in containing player i, i.e., (i) 2 and i 2 (i). Further, we assume that each player i 2 N is endowed with a preference i over N i , i.e., a binary relation over N i which is re ‡exive, complete, and transitive.
Denote by i and i the strict and indi¤erence relation associated with i 
Preferences and the Core
Each each agent i c 2 N a [ N b , c 2 fa; bg, is endowed with quality level q c i . 4 Without loss of generality, we index the agents in such a way that q a 1 > q a 2 > : : : > q a m > 0 and q b 1 > q b 2 > : : : > q b n > 0; thus, 1 c is the member of N c with the highest quality, 2 c is the member of N c with the second highest quality, and so on.
We assume that players'choice of group membership is driven by status-seeking. We distinguish between two types of status: local status which is de…ned by a player's relative position among the members of the group of his own type; and global status as de…ned by the average quality of the group members of the opposite type. For all coalitions S N and c 2 fa; bg, we
be the type-speci…c average quality of group S.
We follow the convention q c (S) = 0 for S \ N c = ;.
Consider an agent i c 2 N c , c 2 fa; bg, and a group S 2 N i c . As a member of group S agent i c derives utility according to the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function summarizes her global status. Notice that while global status is always a positive number, local status may be negative. This will be the case for all players in a group whose quality is below that of the average quality of the players of the same type who are members of this group. The two positive parameters and capture the relative weight attributed to local and global status, respectively. Given this CES utility function, we further need to assume that is an odd positive integer, otherwise for some values 5 , there may be a coalition in which a player, whose quality is below the average quality of the players of the same type, attains a higher local status than a player of the same type with quality above this average. The 5 In particular, we will discuss the case ! 1.
elasticity of substitution between the two types of status is constant and is given by .
Finally, we de…ne the properties of segregation and integration on which our analysis of the core stable outcomes will focus. Following Watts (2007, Def. 3), a coalition structure is segregated if (i) given any three agents
we have k c 2 (i c ); and (ii) given any four agents
Next, we characterize the core as a function of the parameter values. We …rst consider the two extreme cases: where only local status matters; and
where only global status matters.
Local Status
If agents look only at the groups of their own type and are guided by the distance between their own quality and the average quality of the group, their preferences over compositions of a-and b-groups may be represented by (1) with set equal to 0. That is for all i c 2 N c , c 2 fa; bg, and any
Our …rst result is straightforward. 6 Consider the set of coalition structures in which there is at most one player of each type in a coalition structure element, i.e.,
It is easy to show that fully describes the core is this case. In other words, in a core stable coalition structure there are no coalitions containing at least two distinct players of the same type -if this were the case, then among those players of the same type, the one with the lowest quality would prefer to stay alone, and hence, can block the corresponding coalition structure. 7 Clearly, the set of core stable outcomes when only local status matters are all segregated in nature.
Global Status
Consider next the other extreme case in which there are no own-type peer e¤ects and each player seeks a group membership where the players of the opposite type have higher average quality. 8 Players' preferences are thus represented by (1) with = 0 that takes the form
The core in this case is again non-empty as for instance the following three coalition structures are core stable.
; N a n f1 a gg;
Clearly, coalition structure 0 is the one most preferred by the b-type agents as they are in the same coalition with the a-group with the highest average quality. Similarly, 00 is the most preferred core stable coalition structure by the a-type agents. One can think of 000 , instead, as a "fair" coalition structure as the best set of a-agents is grouped together with the best set of b-agents. 9 While 000 is a segregated outcome which is in the core of any hedonic game with this type of preferences, outcomes 0 and 00 have a hybrid nature: they are segregated with respect to one type of players and integrated with respect to the other.
Keeping these three examples in mind, let us now fully describe the set of core stable coalition structures for this extreme case. We precede the main result by providing an algorithm which delivers a partition of the set of agents N a [ N b into compositions of a-and b-groups.
Algorithm 1
Set N 1 := N a , N 2 := N b , and := ;.
Repeat the following until N 1 [ N 2 = ;:
Return .
We denote by e the set of all partitions delivered by the above algorithm. Notice …rst that by construction the average quality of the groups A p and B p , p = 1; : : : ; P , is non-negative. Suppose now that X N is blocking
. Then it has to be the case that X \ N a 6 = ; and X \ N b 6 = ;. Let p = min fp :
B p and that, by construction, we have either
p=1 B p and combining (4) with either (5) or (6), we have a contradiction. 
We conclude that is core stable.
Suppose now that = C 1 ; C 2 ; : : : ; C R is a core stable coalition structure but = 2 e . Let A r := C r \ N a and B r := C r \ N a for all C r 2 .
W.l.o.g., let the coalition structure elements of be ordered in such a way that = A 1 Notice …rst that if there is a coalition structure element C r 2 s.t.
jA r j 2 and jB r j 2, then will be not core stable as the higher quality a-and b-agents in C r would block it by forming a coalition. Thus, for all C r 2 either A r 2 f0; 1g and B r 1, or A r 1 and B r 2 f0; 1g.
Next, take A 1 [ B 1 and consider the following possible cases. implies that u 1 a ( (1 a )) < q b 1 and u 1 b ( (1 b )) = 0 < q a 1 . Thus, we have a contradiction to the core stability of .
and A 1 = 2 fA 0 N a : q(A 0 ) max fq a i : i a 2 N a n A 0 gg 3 f1 a g, then, by the same reasoning as in Case 1, coalition 1 a ; 1 b can block . Hence, we conclude that A 1 has to have the structure as indicated in the above algorithm.
Furthermore, if A 1 = n i a 2 N a : q a i q a j for all j a 2 N a o = f1 a g and
and q a 1 > q(A r ) hold for all r = 2; : : : ; R (note that 1 b \ N a = A r for some r 2 f2; : : : ; Rg). Thus, we have again a contradiction to the core stability of .
The case in which B 1 = 1 can be treated similarly. In an analogous way one can show that all elements of have the structure provided by the above algorithm. We conclude that the core stability of implies 2 e .
As a corollary of Proposition 1, one can note that a fully integrated coalition structure is never in the core of a hedonic game when preference are based on global status. The reason for this is that there is at most a single representative of at least one of the players types in every coalition structure element derived by Algorithm 1.
Local and Global Status
Here we discuss those cases in which both local and global status determine players'choice of group membership.
The …rst case we discuss is when local and global status are (imperfect)
complements. In this case we obtain a generic uniqueness of the core as in all core stable coalition structures, players obtain zero utility. The proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward. It is easy to show that (1) takes the form u i c (S) = minf (q c i q c (S)); q c 0 (S)g
when ! 0; and the form
when ! 1.
Equations (7) and (8) imply that no two players of the same type will be members of the same coalition in a core stable coalition structure. This is because the player with the lower quality will obtain a negative utility and therefore will block this coalition structure by staying alone (recall that in (8) is an odd integer). Therefore, in all core stable coalition structures each player obtains local status of 0. Finally, notice that irrespective of whether a player is in a group with any other player of the opposite type or stays alone, her utility is 0 since qualities are strictly positive.
Next, we study the core stable coalition structures when players perceive the two types of status as being substitutable. Our …rst set of results discusses perfect substitutability between the two types of status. For this we will need the following additional notation. (2) For any two non-empty a-and b-groups A 0 and B 0 with (i a )\N b * B 0 for all i a 2 A 0 the following two implications hold:
Proof. As = , w.l.og., we can let = = 1. In addition, ! 1
implies that (1) takes the form
Let be a coalition structure satisfying items (1) and (2) of Theorem 1. We show that it is core stable. Suppose not, i.e., there is X N with
for all i a 2 A, and
Suppose …rst that A = ;. Notice then that the lowest quality agent in B
can attain at most zero utility in the blocking coalition. As is individually rational, a coalition consisting of b-type agents only cannot be blocking .
For a similar reason, a coalition which consist of only a-type agents cannot be blocking either.
Next, suppose that the blocking coalition consists of both a-and b-type agents, and that there are i a 2 A and i b 2 B such that i b 2 (i a ). Simple algebra shows that the above two inequalities cannot hold simultaneously for these two agents.
Last, suppose that the blocking coalition consists of both a-and b-type agents such that there are no two agents of two distinct types who are grouped together under . Such blocking possibilities are ruled out by item (2) in the statement of the theorem. To see this, notice that agent
Hence, for the incentives of agents i a and i b to be part of the blocking coalition X = A [ B, it must be that
. Therefore, item (2) guarantees that there is an a-agent (condition (2.1)) or a b-agent (condition (2.2)) for which such AB cannot be found.
As to show that items (1) and (2) are also necessary for a coalitional matching to be core stable, let be core stable and do not satisfy (1) .
This implies the existence of i a 2 N a and i b 2 N b with (i a ) = fi a g and i b = i b . Notice however that the pair i a ; i b is blocking in contradiction to its core stability.
Suppose …nally that is core stable and does not satisfy (2) . Consider …rst the case in which there are a-and b-groups A 0 and B 0 with (i a ) \ N b * B 0 for all i a 2 A 0 such that A 0 B 0 > max B 0 \B6 =; AB and A 0 B 0 < min A 0 \A6 =; AB hold (i.e., (2.1) is violated). Consider then the coalition A 0 [ B 0 . To see that this coalition blocks , notice that all This result implies that it is not only that higher ranked agents of each type are grouped together under this condition, but also that a certain fairness requirement is satis…ed: the average quality of each a-group belonging to a coalition in the partition exceeds/falls under the average quality of the b-group in this coalition by the same amount.
To illustrate the signi…cance of Corollary 1 for the stability of segregating outcomes, we refer again to Example 1 above. In this example, we study a segregated outcome in which the highest ranked individuals from each type are grouped together, the second highest individuals of each type are also grouped together, and the lowest ranked a-agent remains single. As the analysis shows this segregated matching is not in the core, and indeed Corollary 1's condition, the di¤erences between the average quality of aand b-groups belonging to the same coalition must be equal, is not satis…ed for this partition: f1 a gf1 b g = 1, and f2 a gf2 b g = 0. The following example shows a coalition formation problem in which the core contains a segregated outcome.
Example 2 Let N a = f1 a ; 2 a ; 3 a g and N b = f1 b ; 2 b g with q a 1 = 4, q b 1 = 3, q a 2 = 2, and q b 2 = q a 3 = 1. Let agents' preferences be represented by the CES utility function given in (1) with ! 1 and = = 1.
Consider the coalition structure with (1 a ) = (1 b ) = f1 a ; 1 b g, (2 a ) = (2 b ) = f2 a ; 2 b g, and (3 a ) = f3 a g. It is easy to see that is core stable as there exists no blocking coalition. Notice that f1 a gf1 b g = f2 a gf2 b g = f3 a g; = 1.
The next corollary describes conditions under which a fully integrated coalition structure is stable.
Corollary 2 Let (N; ) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences represented by the CES utility function given in (1) . Let = and ! 1. and q(B k ) = q(B k+1 ) for all k = 1; : : : ; K 1 guarantees that condition (2) of Theorem 1 is satis…ed as well. In other words, condition (2) of Theorem 1 is satis…ed for all fully integrated coalition structures, and, therefore for such a partition to be in the core, only the individually rationality condition may be a constraining factor.
As an example of a coalition formation problem for which a fully integrated outcome is in the core, consider again Example 1. The coalition structure N a [ N b is fully integrated and it is in the core.
Our next result shows that under perfect substitutability of the a-and b-groups when = , there always exists a core stable coalition structure.
Theorem 2 Let (N; ) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences represented by the CES utility function given in (1) with = and ! 1.
Then a core stable coalition structure exists.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm for delivering a coalition structure.
Algorithm 2
We initialize the algorithm by setting A 0 = N a , B 0 = N b , A 0 = ;, and B 0 = ;. In the k th step of the algorithm, we set
The algorithm stops when A`= A` 1 and B`= B` 1 and we set K =`. De…ne the coalition
We show that is core stable. First, we will show that K is …nite, and, in particular that it is an integer at most equal to n + 1. Notice that either A 1 = ; or B 1 = ;; otherwise there is an agent with negative quality, which is not possible. For ease of exposition, suppose that A 1 = ;. Since
. This is why for all a-agents q a i q(A 2 )+q(B 2 ) 0.
Similarly, one can show that A K = N a and A K = ;. The above analysis and the fact that N b is …nite proves that K is …nite. Moreover, as q(N a ) > 0 and q(N b ) > 0, implies that A K 6 = ; and B K 6 = ;, and, therefore K n + 1.
Next, we will show that there is no coalition X that blocks the constructed partition . Suppose, on the contrary, that such a coalition exists.
First, suppose that X consists of homogeneous type agents, i.e., X N a or X N b . Notice that by construction all agents in A K and B K have at least zero utility under . Furthermore, all agents in A K and B K have also zero utility under . Since the agents with the lowest quality in X can obtain at most zero utility in X, the coalition X cannot be blocking .
Suppose next that there are at least two agents i a ; i b 2 X who belong to the same coalition in . For X to be blocking it must be that
and
Simple algebra shows that the above two inequalities cannot hold simultaneously.
Last suppose that there are at least two agents i a ; i b 2 X who belong to di¤erent coalitions in . W.l.o.g., suppose that i a 2 A K and i b 2 B K . It is easy to see that the agent with the highest quality level in A K , is one who is in A K (and therefore in A K 1 ) but not in A K 2 . Denote this agent by i a . Then, by construction, we have
Furthermore, notice that by de…nition of i a , q( e A) q a i for all e A A K .
Therefore, for X to be blocking it must be that for the b-agent in X with the lowest quality, denoted by i b , it must hold that
where the last inequality follows from X \ N a A K (note that X \ A K 6 = ;
would mean that there are a b-agent (i b ) and an a-agent who belong to the same coalition in implying, as shown above, that X is not blocking ).
Clearly, expressions (10) and (11) First, we present a technical result.
Lemma 1 Let X N c , c 2 fa; bg, be such that jXj 2 and let i be the lowest quality member of X. Then
Proof. Let X and i be as above. Then,
where inequality (13) follows from the de…nition of q c min and inequality (14) follows from jXj 2.
Now we are ready to present our …nal result. Proof. Notice that ! 1 implies that (1) takes the form
First we consider coalition structure as de…ned above and show that it is core stable. As there is at most one representative of each type in a coalition structure element, each player derives 0 utility from local status. As individual qualities are strictly positive, it is clear from (15) , that all players derive a non-negative utility in the coalition structure, and, therefore it is individually rational. Next, suppose that there is a blocking coalition X such that jX \ N c j 2 for some c 2 fa; bg. Let i c 2 X be the player with lowest quality in X \ N c . For some c 0 2 fa; bg with c 0 6 = c, the utility player i c can derive in X is given by
where inequality (16) otherwise. Hence, for player i b k to attain higher utility in X, X \ N a = fi à :`2 1; : : : ; minfm; k 1gg. Player i à utility in , however, is q b iẁ hich is higher than q b i k that is the utility she can achieve in X. This establishes a contradiction.
Last, we show that there is no other coalition structure which is core stable. From the analysis above (i.e., inequalities (16) (17) (18) ), it is clear that the only individually rational coalition structures are those for which there is at most one player of each type in a coalition structure element. Suppose, that there is an individually rational coalition structure 0 which is core stable and suppose that f1 a ; 1 b g 6 2 0 . Then 0 can be blocked by coalition
similarly, u 1 b 0 (1 b ) = q a i < q a 1 for all i a 2 N a n f1 a g. Similarly by iteration, we can show that if 0 is core stable, then it must contain the coalitions fi a ; i b g for all i 2 1; : : : ; m. Finally notice that the only individually rational partition of the player set N b n f1 b ; : : : ; m b g is that into singletons. This implies that 0 and must coincide.
Conclusion
We study group formation when agents Notice that the coalition structure derived by the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 2 can be one of the type of partitions described in Corollary 2 in case the grand coalition is individually rational for all agents. When this is not the case, this algorithm derives a stable outcome of what we may call a 'hybrid' construct. In this coalition structure all agents of one type are grouped together with a strict subset of the agents of the other type, hence, these agents are in an integrated state. The other type of agents, instead, are in a segregated state because there is a quality threshold such that all agents of this type whose quality is higher are grouped together with all the agents of the opposite type and all those whose quality is lower stay single.
Finally, our results may be seen as providing an alternative mechanism to the one discussed by Frank (1985) for gluing individuals together in social groups when they care for local status. Frank argues that what keeps a lowranked individual in a group with higher ranked individuals are transaction costs (see Frank, 1985, p. 10) . These transaction costs outweigh the gains such an individual might reap from moving to another group where her local status will be higher. In our setting transaction costs are zero. What keeps low-ranked individuals in a group with higher ranked individuals is the access to a group with another type of agents that this membership provides.
